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Abstract—Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) noise can
be considered as a spread-spectrum watermark embedded in
every image taken by the source imaging device. It has been
effectively used for localizing the forgeries in digital images. The
noise residual extracted from the image in question is compared
with the reference PRNU in a sliding-window based manner. If
their normalized cross correlation, which servers as a decision
statistic, is below a pre-determined threshold (e.g., by Neyman-
Pearson criterion), the center pixel in the window is declared
as forged. However, the decision statistic is calculated over the
forged and the non-forged regions when the sliding window falls
near the boundary of the two different regions. As a result, the
corresponding pixels of the forged region are probably wrongly
identified as genuine ones. To alleviate this problem, we analyze
the correlation distribution in the problematic region and refine
the detection by weighting the decision threshold based on the
altered correlation distribution. The effectiveness of the proposed
refining algorithm is confirmed through the results of detecting
three different kinds of realistic image forgeries.
I. INTRODUCTION
Detecting image forgeries is an interesting while very
challenging task due to the variety of image manipulations
a user can perform with increasingly powerful image editing
softwares. Active techniques, such as digital watermarking,
are effective in verifying the authenticity of an image, but
the requirement of originally embedding into the protected
image limits their widespread use in practice. Therefore, there
has been growing interest in passive techniques. As one of
the most promising passive techniques, Photo Response Non-
Uniformity (PRNU) noise arises primarily from the manufac-
turing imperfections and the inhomogeneity of silicon wafers.
It can be considered as an intrinsic watermark embedded in
every image captured by the source device. Its uniqueness
to individual camera and stability against environmental con-
ditions make PRNU noise a powerful and robust tool for
exposing image forgery [1]–[6]. Its capability of detecting
image forgeries irrespective of the specific type of forgery
arouses wide attention of the researchers in the field of digital
forensics. In [1], a PRNU-based technique was proposed either
for detecting the image forgeries in user-selected region or
automatically identifying forged image regions. It was then
refined in [2], where both the false acceptance rate (FAR) (i.e.,
misidentifying a tampered block as non-tampered) and the
false rejection rate (FRR) (i.e., wrongly labeling non-tampered
blocks as tampered) are considered. Chierchia et al. proposed
several improvements concerning either the better estimation
of PRNU noise [7] or the higher resolution of the detection
results [6], [8].
Since PRNU pattern, by its very nature, is a very weak
noise-like signal, its reliable detection requires jointly pro-
cessing a large number of pixel samples, e.g., in a sliding-
window manner. As pointed out in [3], [6], when the sliding
window falls near the boundary of the tampered and the non-
tampered regions, the decision statistic becomes a weighted
average of two different contributions and probably leads to a
high FAR. This problem can be alleviated by means of hard
[3] or soft [6] image segmentation to obtain the boundary
information before detection. These two algorithms share the
same essence of making use of the extra structure information
of the image content, but their drawbacks are twofold: Firstly,
the detection result heavily depends on the quality of image
segmentation or the pilot image [9], but an accurate image
segmentation or high-quality pilot image is not easy to obtain.
The second and most critical drawback is that they become
helpless in detecting some occlusive forgeries, where objects
in the original scene are hidden by placing a homogeneous
background on them, e.g., a person is masked by a grass patch
or an airplane is covered by a sky patch.
This work also aims at improving the resolution of PRNU-
based image forgery detection, but it approaches the issue
from a different perspective. Starting from an initial detection,
we model how the decision statistic changes as the sliding
window moves across the boundary of two different regions
(i.e., tampered and non-tampered) and adjust the decision
threshold accordingly to achieve a more satisfactory detection.
In what follows, Section II revisit the background of detecting
image forgeries based on PRNU noise, Section III presents the
proposed algorithm and Section IV validates the proposed al-
gorithm by detecting realistic image forgeries. Finally, Section
V concludes this work.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will revisit the algorithm proposed in [2].
Let noise residual w ∈ RN be the difference of the observed
image g ∈ RN and its denoised version fˆ = F(g):
w = g − fˆ
= (1 + k)f + θ − fˆ
= gk + (f − g)k + (f − fˆ) + θ
= gk + v, (1)
where k is the PRNU noise, f is the noise-free image, θ is
an additive noise accounting for all other interferences and
v is the sum of θ and the two additive terms introduced by
the denoising filter [10]. When an image region is tampered
with, the PRNU signal in the noise residual w of that region is
lost. Therefore, image forgeries can be exposed by identifying
the image regions where PRNU signal is absent. Like in [2],
we formulate the problem of detecting PRNU signal in noise
residual w as a binary hypothesis test{
H0 : w = v
H1 : w = z + v,
(2)
where z = gk is the signal of interest (also called the reference
PRNU) and v is PRNU-irrelevant noise. For a target pixel qi,
a decision statistic ρi is calculated based on the normalized
cross correlation (NCC) between wNi and zNi :
ρi =
∑
j∈Ni (wj − w¯)(zj − z¯)√∑
j∈Ni (wj − w¯)2
√∑
j∈Ni(zj − z¯)2
, (3)
where Ni is the pixel indices within the n×n sliding window
centered at qi. To reveal the forgery, ρi is then compared with
a threshold γ1:
uˆi =
{
1, ρi < γ1
0, otherwise
(4)
where uˆi ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value indicating the forgery (1
for forgery and 0 for genuine pixel). γ1 is usually selected
according to the Neyman-Person criterion to ensure a small
false acceptance rate (FAR), i.e., Pr(uˆi = 0|ui = 1), with
ui ∈ {0, 1} the ground truth. However, even for the non-forged
pixels, the NCC coefficients might happen to be very low in
the image areas of dark, saturated or highly textured. Based
on the relationship between the correlations and the local
image features, this problem is addressed in [2] by estimating
correlation distribution p(x|H1) under hypothesis H1 and
correcting the tampered pixels for which the false rejection
rate (misidentifying non-tampered as tampered) higher than a
threshold γ2, i.e., ∫ γ1
−∞
p(x|H1)dx > γ2, (5)
to non-tampered.
We would like to spend more words on the estimation of
the correlation distribution under hypothesis H0 and H1 (i.e.,
p(x|H0) and p(x|H1)), respectively. It was observed in our
experiments that if the reference PRNU (i.e., z in Equation
(2)), is preprocessed by the Wiener Filtering in DFT domain
[2] or our recently proposed spectrum equalization algorithm
[11], p(x|H0) fits quite well with the Gaussian distribution
N (0, 1/d), where d = n × n is the number of pixels within
the square sliding window. For the estimation of p(x|H1), we
use the Gaussian model like in [5] rather than the generalized
Gaussian model in [2] due to its simplicity and effectiveness.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
We assume that the d-dimensional signal within the sliding
window, either for the estimated zNi or wNi , is standardized to
have zero mean and unit variance, which means each element,
zj or wj (j ∈ Ni), is independently drawn from the identical
normal distribution N (0, 1). Presumably, each element in the
standardized signal can be modeled as the sum of the true
PRNU signal and other irrelevant interferences:{
wj = xj + αj
zj = yj + βj ,
(6)
where xj follows a Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2) and αj
conforms toN (0, 1−σ2). Likewise, yj ∼ N (0, λσ2) and βj ∼
N (0, 1−λσ2). Here, σ2 and λσ2 can be viewed as the quality
of the true PRNU signal in wNi and zNi , respectively. Note
that λ accounts for the different qualities of the PRNU signal
in wNi and zNi . With the standardized signal, the decision
statistic ρi in Equation (3) is simplified as
ρi =
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
(xjyj + αjyj + βjxj + αjβj). (7)
If x and y are from two different cameras (i.e., under hy-
pothesis H0), using the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), ρi
follows a Gaussian distribution N (µ0,Σ0), where µ0 = 0 and
Σ0 = 1/d. While under hypothesis H1, we have yi =
√
λxi.
Therefore, Equation (7) can be rewritten as
ρi =
1
d
∑
j∈Ni
(
√
λx2j +
√
λαjxj + βjxj + αjβj). (8)
It is known that x2j/σ
2 follows the Chi-square distribution with
1 degree of freedom, χ2(1). So based on the assumption that
xj , αj and βj are mutually independent, we can easily arrive
at
ρi ∼ N (µ1,Σ1), (9)
where {
µ1 =
√
λσ2
Σ1 = (1 + λσ
4)/d.
(10)
⌦1
⌦2qi
Fig. 1: The square sliding window across the non-tampered
region Ω1 and the tampered region Ω2.
Equation (9) is the decision statistic distribution if the
sliding window falls completely on the non-tampered region.
To see how the problematic region violates the distribution,
let us look at Fig. 1, which shows a sliding window across
the non-tampered region Ω1 (in green background) and the
tampered region Ω2 (in yellow background). The decision
statistic therefore becomes a weighted average of two different
contributions:
ρi =
1
n1
∑
j∈Ω1
(
√
λx2j +
√
λαjxj + βjxj + αjβj)
+
1
n2
∑
j∈Ω2
(xjyj + αjyj + βjxj + αjβj), (11)
where n1 and n2 are the number of pixels in Ω1 and Ω2, re-
spectively. xj and yj are independent in the second summation
term for region Ω2. Therefore,
ρi ∼ N (µ,Σ) (12)
where {
µ =
√
λσ2n1/d
Σ = 1/d+ λn1σ
4/d2,
(13)
To drop the unknown λ and σ2, we finally rewrite Equation
(13) as the form of weighting µ1 and Σ1{
µ = n1µ1/d
Σ = (n1dΣ1 + d− n1)/d2,
(14)
where d = n1 + n2. This is the final expression of the
distribution of decision statistic in the boundary region. As
shown in Fig. 2, if n1 = 0, which means the sliding window
entirely falls in the tampered region, the decision statistic ρi
conforms to N (µ0,Σ0). As the sliding window moves away
and completely falls in the non-tampered region, ρi follows
the distribution N (µ1,Σ1). After analyzing the correlation
distribution in the problematic area near the boundary of the
tampered and the non-tampered regions, we therefore propose
an algorithm to alleviate the miss detection problem as follows:
1) Calculate the correlation ρi between the noise residual
wNi and the estimated reference PRNU signal zNi within
the sliding window Ni centered at pixel qi.
2) Estimate the expected correlation ρ¯i and the variance
σ2H1 of the NCC coefficients under hypothesis H1 using
the correlation predictor proposed in [2];
3) Select two thresholds γ1 and γ2 to obtain an initial
detection result uˆi using Equation (4) and (5).
4) Obtain the number ni of pixels in the sliding window
centered at pixel qi that belong to the non-tampered
region by convoluting a n × n matrix of ones with the
initial detection result.
5) Calculate a new threshold γi1 for each pixel by solving
the following equation
1
σi
∫ γi1
−∞
e
− (t−µi)2
2σ2
i dt =
∫ γ1
−∞
e−
t2
2 dt, (15)
where {
µi = ρ¯ini/d
σ2i = (σ
2
H1dni + d− ni)/d2.
(16)
The purpose of Equation (15) is to guarantee the same
desired FAR in the boundary region as in other regions
according to the altered distribution as formulated in
Equation (14).
6) Label a pixel qi as tampered (uˆi = 1) if ρi < γi1.
7) Label a tampered pixel (uˆi = 1) as non-tampered if
1√
2piσH1
∫ γ1
−∞
e
− (t−ρ¯i)2
2σ2
H1 dt > γ2. (17)
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Fig. 2: How the correlation distribution changes as the sliding
window moves across the boundary region.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we will report some preliminary experi-
ments meant to support the idea of weighting the thresh-
old accordingly in the boundary regions to improve the
detection resolution. Our experiments were carried out on
three cameras, a Cannon IXY500, a Olympus C730UZ and
a FujiFilm FinePix A920. BM3D [12] denoising algorithm
was used to extract the noise residual from images. 50 blue
sky images from each camera were used to estimate the
reference PRNU noise, which is further preprocessed by the
algorithm proposed in [11] to reduce the false positives and
make the correlation distribution under hypothesis H0 fit better
to the theoretical distribution N (0, 1/d). Another 20 natural
images were randomly selected for each camera to train the
correlation predictor proposed in [2]. All images taken by the
three cameras have the same size of 1536 × 2048 pixels.
Additionally, as shown in Fig. 3, three different kinds of
forgeries were involved:
• Scaling forgery (image 1): A direction board in a image
taken by FujiFilm FinePix A920 is enlarged.
• Cut-and-paste forgery (image 2): A car in a image is cut
and pasted onto another image. The two images are both
taken by Olympus C730UZ.
• Copy-and-move forgery (image 3): A computer in a
image taken by Cannon IXY500 is copy and move to
a new location in the same image.
We attempt to compare the proposed algorithm, which
weights threshold controlling the FAR in the boundary region,
with the method based on the constant false acceptance rate
(CFAR) decision rule in [2]. From left to right, Figure 3 shows
(a) original image, (b) forged image, (c) predicted correlation
field, (d) actual correlation field, (e) detection result by CFAR
and (f) refined detection result based on (e). The forged
area is highlighted in white, the correctly detected area is
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Fig. 3: Forgery detection results for scaling (the first row), copy-and-move (the second row) and cut-and-paste (the third row)
forgery. (a) Original image, (b) forged image, (c) predicted correlation field, (d) actual correlation field, (e) detection result by
CFAR and (f) refined detection result by our proposed algorithm.
highlighted in green, while the area falsely labeled as tampered
is highlighted in red. From top to down, the detection results
are shown for the three kinds of image forgeries, i.e., scaling,
cut-and-paste and copy-and-move forgery, respectively. The
size of sliding window is set to 256 × 256 pixels. The two
thresholds γ1 and γ2 are set to 0.01 and 0.05, respectively. It
is worth mentioning that we did not apply any morphological
operation.
The first image is a simple case, where an enlarged direction
board is placed on a smooth and bright wall. It is not surprising
to see both the proposed algorithm and CFAR can accurately
detect the forged area. But the proposed refining algorithm
clearly does a better job in the upper and the bottom boundary
of the forged direction board without introducing any false
positives. The second row of Fig 3 shows the detection of
the cut-and-paste forgery. As can be seen, the false positives
are hard to avoid due to the dark area of the traffic lights
and the complex background, e.g., trees and grass. In spite of
introducing slightly more false positives, most of the forged car
is reliably detected. Similar result can be observed in detecting
smaller tampered area, as shown in the third row of Fig. 3.
The refined detection result reveals part of the forgery in the
stand of the monitor, which is completely ignored by CFAR.
By revealing more possible forgeries in the boundary areas,
the refined detection result apparently fits more closely to
the actual shape of the tampered area, which can potentially
provide the forensic investigator with more detailed and sug-
gestive information. Like in [5], we show the upper envelope
of (FPR,TPR) points in Fig. 4. What can be seen in Fig. 4
is that the superiority of the refining algorithm seems more
evident in the more challenging detection tasks. The refining
algorithm is slightly better than CFAR in the simplest case,
while the equal error rate (EER) increases from 91.7% to
95.3% for image 2 and from 81.8% to 93.8% for image 3.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have proposed a refining scheme for
PRNU-based detection of image forgeries. We model the cor-
relation distribution near the boundary across the tampered and
the non-tampered regions and weight the threshold accordingly
to achieve the desired false acceptance rate. Despite some
possible false positives introduced (e.g., γ1 is set too small),
the overall better performance has been verified in the task of
detecting three different kinds of realistic image forgeries. We
believe that this work will facilitate forensic investigators to
get a more accurate and informative detection result.
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